

discharged permanent status employee has the right to appeal.

In this case, the district court granted the city of Eastman's motion for summary judgment finding that:

[S]ince Georgia has retained its adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine, and since the hearings process described in the personnel manual did not apply to department heads, Mr. Crowell simply had no property interest in his job that would implicate due process protections. The fact that Mr. Crowell was told that the personnel manual would apply to him is not inconsistent with this conclusion. The manual naturally applied to all city employees; however, certain provisions affected some employees and not others. Absent some allegation that the city manager represented the manual's specific procedural protections as applicable to Mr. Crowell's occupation, this evidence does not advance plaintiff's case.

Because we find that a factual issue exists as to whether Reddock represented that the manual's procedural protections were applicable to Crowell's occupation, summary judgment in this case is improper.<sup>3</sup> In his affidavit, Crowell alleges that he inquired as to whether the personnel manual would establish his rights and duties as a city employee, and further alleges that Reddock advised him that the manual did provide such coverage. If Reddock informed Crowell that all of the manual's provisions applied to him, Crowell may be entitled to procedural protections afforded to regular full-time employees. We note that section 6 of the manual authorizes a city manager to individually establish conditions of employment for department heads. Further, section 35(d) of the manual provides that a permanent status employee cannot be terminated without cause and only "after being informed of the reasons in writing." Summary judgment is improper where material factual disputes exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); *see gen-*

3. It is difficult to understand the district court's statement: "Absent some allegation...." As we read Crowell's affidavit, just such an allegation is made. Likewise, Crowell's brief in this court

*erally Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co.*, 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1983).

Whether Reddock did in fact make such representations to Crowell may be dispositive in this case because Georgia law establishes a property interest when a public employee can only be terminated for cause. *Barnett*, 707 F.2d at 1576; *Ogletree*, 682 F.2d at 1369-70; *Brownlee v. Williams*, 212 S.E.2d at 362; *see also Bishop*, 426 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. at 2077. Once an individual has a legitimate claim to a property interest, procedural due process provides the vehicle for a vindication of such claims. *Roth*, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.

Finally, the city of Eastman argues that because the charter authorizes Reddock to discharge officials with or without cause, even if the manual creates a property right, the charter provision should prevail. Because we find that a factual issue exists concerning Reddock's representations, if any, to Crowell, we do not comment on which document controls.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.



SMITHKLINE DIAGNOSTICS, INC.,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HELENA LABORATORIES CORPORATION,  
Defendant/Cross-Appellant.

Appeal Nos. 87-1532, 87-1533.

United States Court of Appeals,  
Federal Circuit.

Oct. 12, 1988.

Holder of patent covering specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in

states: "The City Manager made the manual applicable by virtue of pre-employment discussions...." Appellant's Brief, page 9.

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fecal matter brought infringement action against competitor. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Joe J. Fisher, J., ruled that the patent was valid but not infringed, 662 F.Supp. 622, and patent holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nies, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) patent was not invalid for obviousness, and (2) patent was literally infringed by competitor's product.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

#### 1. Patents ⇌165(4)

Patent covering specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in fecal matter, which had claim limitation for compound reacting to environmental conditions in manner "similar to hemoglobin," included hemoglobin itself as positive monitor catalyst, in light of claim language, specification, and prosecution history.

#### 2. Patents ⇌16.33

Patent covering specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in fecal matter was not invalid for obviousness. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 103, 282.

#### 3. Patents ⇌92

Statute permitting inventors to apply for patent jointly even though they did not physically work together or at the same time and did not make same contribution applied retroactively to patent issued prior to statute's effective date, even though action challenging patent's validity was pending on date of statute's enactment; patent was challenged under "all claims" rule, which was not uniformly accepted as substantive law before statute was enacted. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 116; Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, § 106(a, e), 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 note.

#### 4. Patents ⇌229

Patent covering specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in fecal matter was literally infringed by patent holder's competitor's use of test slide using hemoglobin as positive monitor catalyst.

#### 5. Patents ⇌229

Competitor's use of hemoglobin-containing slides to test for blood in fecal matter did not perform same or similar function in substantially different way as patented specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in fecal matter so as to require finding of noninfringement under reverse doctrine of equivalents.

#### 6. Patents ⇌229

Admittedly noninfringing product marketed by patent holder's competitor was not converted by estoppel to infringing product when competitor marketed product with packaging insert that incorrectly stated that product contained catalyst that would have caused product to be infringing had catalyst actually been present. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).

#### 7. Patents ⇌97

Competitor's allegation, that holder of patent covering specimen test slide and method for detecting blood in fecal matter failed to disclose material information and to disclose information accurately while prosecuting patent, was insufficient to hold patent unenforceable, absent evidence of actual wrongful intent or gross negligence by patentee.

Donald Dunner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and Dunner, Washington, D.C., argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Allen M. Sokal. Also on the brief were Alan D. Lourie and Stuart R. Suter, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.

Jerald I. Schneider, Spencer & Frank, Washington, D.C., argued for defendant/cross-appellant. With him on the brief was Charles R. Rutherford, Cullen, Sloman, Cantor, Grauer, Scott & Rutherford, Detroit, Mich.

Before RICH and NIES, Circuit Judges, and NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.

NIES, Circuit Judge.

SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. (SKD) appeals the final judgment of the United

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States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, *SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp.*, 662 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Tex.1987), holding United States Patent No. 4,365,970 ('970) valid as between the parties but not infringed by either of two accused products of Helena Laboratories Corp. Based on its holding of noninfringement, the court dismissed SKD's complaint. SKD appeals the findings of noninfringement. In a cross appeal, Helena asserts that if the judgment of noninfringement is not affirmed, this court should reverse the judgment that the asserted claims are not invalid for obviousness. Helena also asserts error in that the court did not uphold other pleaded defenses or its counterclaim for unfair competition, matters on which the court made no explicit findings or conclusions.

We affirm the judgment of validity, but on different grounds from those stated by the district court. On the issue of infringement, we affirm the finding that Helena's product containing lead acetate does not infringe the asserted claims but reverse with respect to Helena's product containing hemoglobin. Helena has failed to persuade us that the record shows triable issues on the other matters raised in its cross appeal. Thus, we affirm-in-part on modified grounds, reverse-in-part, and remand for calculation of damages.

# I

## BACKGROUND

SKD owns the '970 patent, issued to two of its employees, Dr. Paul Lawrence and Charles Townsley, on December 28, 1982. The patent covers a specimen test slide and method for detecting occult (hidden or invisible) blood in fecal matter, an early symptom of a variety of gastroenterological diseases including colorectal cancer. More specifically, the test slide contains a piece of paper impregnated with a colorless compound, guaiac, which turns blue in the presence of a developing solution, such as hydrogen peroxide, and a catalyst, such as hemoglobin in the blood. Thus, a blue color indicates blood is present, a "positive" result; the absence of blue, a "negative"

result, indicates the absence of blood. In practice, a patient places fecal samples on each of several designated test areas on the slide and returns the slide to his physician or a laboratory for testing. To test, a developing solution is placed on the test areas, and the areas are observed for color. This much of the subject invention is in the prior art. See United States Patent No. 3,996,006 (issued to Pagano on Dec. 7, 1976).

It is important to verify that the guaiac paper and developing solution are working properly. If either the paper or solution has lost effectiveness, a false negative result may occur, failing to detect the presence of existent cancer. Conversely, if the paper or solution becomes contaminated, a false positive test may occur, causing patient anxiety and unnecessary clinical investigations. To ensure accuracy, separate materials (external controls) were sold which could be used to check that the paper and solution were actually working. The parties dispute whether external controls consisted only of a representative unused slide from a batch of slides or also included a slide having three test areas with only one area being used for the fecal smear, the others for testing performance of the product. There is no dispute, however, that in either case the control was not built into the slide.

The invention of the '970 patent improves on the Pagano test slide and separate verification controls by providing built-in positive and negative monitors separate from the test areas. The positive monitor contains (i.e., is printed with) a catalyst, which must be a compound that reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin. The negative monitor lacks the catalyst; thus, it consists of the guaiac-laden paper alone. In practice, developing solution is added to the two monitors after it is applied to the fecal test areas. A blue color on the positive monitor indicates that the paper and solution are working. The absence of blue on the negative monitor assures that the slide has avoided contamination.

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atent improves t separate veri- g built-in posi- separate from e monitor con- catalyst, which acts to environ- ner similar to monitor lacks s of the guaiac- ice, developing monitors after areas. A blue r indicates that working. The gative monitor voided contam-

SKD asserts that independent device claim 1, claims 2 and 4 which depend from claim 1, and independent method claim 5 of the '970 patent are infringed.<sup>1</sup> Claims 1 and 5, the only independent claims asserted, both contain the limitation that the catalyst of the positive monitor is "a compound that reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin." Whether that claim limitation, as properly interpreted, excludes hemoglobin itself is critical, as we shall see, to the issues of validity and infringement.

When the '970 patent issued in December of 1982, SKD was marketing a slide, under the trademark HEMOCCULT, which contained hemin as the catalyst. At that time, Helena had competitive slide products on the market, sold under its COLOSCREEN mark, which used hemoglobin as the catalyst in a positive test monitor. Later, in April of 1984, Helena changed to use of lead acetate rather than hemoglobin as the positive monitor's catalyst. Until November 1985, however, Helena continued to enclose literature in its slide packages stating that the positive monitor contained hemoglobin.

SKD asserted infringement of the '970 claims, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents, by the Helena products containing hemoglobin. With respect to Helena's lead acetate product, SKD asserted

that Helena should be estopped to deny that its product contains hemoglobin because it continued to indicate that the product contained hemoglobin after the change was made to lead acetate. SKD did not assert that the lead acetate product would be covered by the claims but for the misrepresentation.

Helena contended that its products containing hemoglobin do not infringe because the claim language "similar to hemoglobin" literally excludes hemoglobin itself, and that the prosecution history precludes interpreting the claim to cover a hemoglobin product. Helena also asserted that the '970 claims in issue are invalid as obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982), and invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1982) for failure to name the proper inventors. In addition, Helena asserted the defense of inequitable conduct and raised an unfair competition counterclaim.

The district court interpreted the claim limitation at issue as excluding hemoglobin itself. Based upon that interpretation, the court found the invention of the '970 patent nonobvious. Had the claims covered hemoglobin, however, the court stated that the claim would have been invalid as obvious over prior art disclosing hemoglobin as a catalyst in positive test monitors.

1. The '970 patent claims asserted to be infringed are:

1. In an occult blood specimen test slide having a front panel, a rear panel, said front panel having one or more openings, sheet means carrying a test reagent between the front and rear panels underlying each of said openings, a hinged cover adapted to overlies a portion of the front panel and said openings and flap means in the rear panel opposite said openings and pivotable to expose the underside of the sheet, the improvement comprising: an area positioned on a portion of the sheet means facing the rear panel and isolated from the openings in the front panel, said area including a positive and negative monitor, said positive and negative monitors including the test reagent and said positive monitor additionally including a compound that reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin.

2. The slide of claim 1 in which the compound in the positive monitor is a blood component and the test reagent is guaiac.

4. The slide of claim 2 in which the positive and negative monitors are framed by a brightly colored inert border.

5. In a method for determining the presence of occult blood in a specimen test slide having a guaiac treated specimen receiving sheet between a front panel and a rear panel with openings in the front and rear panels and pivotable covers to cover said openings which consists of smearing fecal matter onto the guaiac sheet through an opening of the front panel and applying a developing solution to the guaiac sheet at the corresponding opening in the rear panel the improvement which comprises further applying the developing solution to an area positioned on a portion of the sheet facing the rear panel and isolated from the openings in the front panel, said area including a positive and negative monitor, said positive and negative monitors including the guaiac and said positive monitor additionally including a compound that reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin.

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Under its interpretation of the claim limitation "similar to hemoglobin" recited in claims 1 and 5, the court found Helena's hemoglobin-containing slides noninfringing, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. It rejected SKD's estoppel argument with respect to Helena's products containing lead acetate. It further held that, if Helena were found to infringe, the infringement was not willful, an issue not appealed.

Neither in its judgment nor in its findings of fact and conclusions of law did the district court mention Helena's other defenses or its counterclaim for unfair competition. Both parties have appealed, each asserting error in certain findings and conclusions made adverse to them, and each raising various arguments concerning issues not explicitly ruled on by the court.

## II

### OPINION

#### A. Claim Interpretation

[1] The claims of the '970 patent measure the invention at issue; thus, the claims must be interpreted and given the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses. *See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.*, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227 USPQ 577, 585 (Fed. Cir.1985) (in banc). To ascertain the meaning of the claims, we look to the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history. *ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp.*, 844 F.2d 1576, 1579, 6 USPQ2d 1557, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1988); *Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.*, 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93 (Fed.Cir.1985). Also relevant are the other claims and expert testimony. *See, e.g., Perini America, Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co.*, 832 F.2d 581, 584, 4 USPQ2d 1621, 1624 (Fed.Cir. 1987). Moreover, the claims should be construed as one skilled in the art would construe them. *Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.*, 845 F.2d 981, 986, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1604 (Fed.Cir.1988).

This court reviews a district court's claim interpretation as a matter of law, unbridled by the constraints of the "clearly erroneous"

ous" standard of review. That interpretation may depend, as here, however, on evidentiary material which requires resolution of factual issues, such as what occurred during the prosecution history. *See, e.g., ZMI Corp.*, 844 F.2d at 1578, 6 USPQ2d at 1559; *Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.*, 837 F.2d 1044, 1054, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1441 (Fed.Cir.1988); *Tandon Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n*, 831 F.2d 1017, 1021, 4 USPQ2d 1283, 1286 (Fed. Cir.1987). We review resolution of those factual issues under the clearly erroneous standard. *See, e.g., Perini America*, 832 F.2d at 584, 4 USPQ2d at 1624.

The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the claim limitation "including a compound that reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin," which appears in independent claims 1 and 5 and is, of course, a limitation in dependent claims 2 and 4. Helena argues, and the district court concluded, that the phrase must be interpreted to exclude hemoglobin itself. On the other hand, SKD contends that the phrase encompasses hemoglobin as well as other similar materials. We turn to the sources useful in claim interpretation to resolve this dispute.

#### 1. The Claim Language

The first requirement in claim interpretation is to examine the claim language. *ZMI Corp.*, 844 F.2d at 1579, 6 USPQ2d at 1560; *McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co.*, 736 F.2d 666, 672, 221 USPQ 944, 948 (Fed.Cir.), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 514, 83 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Helena argues that the "ordinary" meaning of "similar to" excludes "identical." Although that argument has a superficial logic, we cannot agree, in the context of these claims, that the phrase "similar to hemoglobin" necessarily excludes hemoglobin.

In finding that the claims exclude hemoglobin, the district court relied upon the statement of one co-inventor, Dr. Lawrence. In a report on his work, Dr. Lawrence had written that "the stabilities of the proteins [such as hemoglobin] are too short to be compatible with standard dating

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of HEMOCCULT slides." <sup>2</sup> The district  
court took that statement to indicate Dr.  
Lawrence's belief that hemoglobin would  
not work. 662 F.Supp. at 628.

Taken in context, however, Dr. Law-  
rence's statement does not indicate that he  
believed hemoglobin would not work at all,  
as shown in the following additional ex-  
cerpts from the report:

A variety of catalysts may be printed:  
for example, ... Fe/protoporphyrin (he-  
min); homo proteins such as hemoglobin  
(Hb) ... may be similarly used.

Printing of proteins such as Hb ...  
presents practical difficulties. High con-  
centrations are required.... More im-  
portant, once printed the stabilities of the  
proteins are too short to be compatible  
with standard [three year] dating of He-  
moccult(R) slides....

....  
[H]emin spots have a dated stability com-  
parable or greater than Hemocult(R)  
slides.

Nowhere does Dr. Lawrence state that  
hemoglobin *cannot* be used. The thrust of  
his analysis is a justification for his prefer-  
ence for hemin over other alternatives, in-  
asmuch as it had sufficient stability to  
meet the standard three-year dating period.  
In fact, Dr. Lawrence states that hemin  
and hemoglobin "may be similarly used."  
Moreover, he testified at trial that hemo-  
globin would work and that methods were  
known for stabilizing hemoglobin, one of  
the problems he noted as a reason why  
hemin works better. In any event, the  
claim does not contain a limitation with  
respect to the duration of the catalyst's  
effectiveness.

We cannot conclude that the claim lan-  
guage indicates what characteristics the  
catalyst must have. The limitation at issue  
does not identify specific catalysts to be  
included or excluded. Viewed in this man-  
ner, the limitation does not exclude hemo-  
globin; rather, it reflects the fact that a  
compound similar to hemoglobin may work  
better than hemoglobin itself.

2. Record of Invention, SKD, Case No. 14084, at  
1 (March 12, 1981). By "instability," Dr. Law-

## 2. Specification

The limitation need not be given a more  
restrictive meaning in the claims of  
the '970 patent by reason of the specifica-  
tion. The specification of the '970 patent  
shows a clear intent by the inventors to  
include hemoglobin when they claimed  
their invention. It states:

Since guaiac-based fecal occult blood  
tests are actually testing for the catalytic  
activity of hemoglobin in blood, the *posi-  
tive monitor should employ either hem-  
oglobin or a catalyst which would react  
to adverse environmental conditions in  
a manner similar to hemoglobin. Pref-  
erably, the test slide of this invention  
employs hemin, a hemoglobin derived  
catalyst, as the catalyst in the positive  
monitor.*

'970 Patent Specification, col. 4, ln. 1-8  
(issued Dec. 28, 1982) (emphasis added).  
Thus, the specification specifically discloses  
hemoglobin and hemin, with the latter pre-  
ferred, as compounds to be used in the  
positive monitor. We agree with SKD that  
it would be a strained interpretation to  
exclude hemoglobin from the claims when  
the specification specifically discloses it as  
a viable candidate for the positive monitor  
catalyst.

Helena offers a convoluted argument to  
overcome the specification's disclosure of  
hemoglobin as a catalyst. The argument  
begins with the premise that the '970 pat-  
ent describes two functions for the moni-  
tor: testing both for proper functioning of  
the chemicals (guaiac and developer) and  
for deterioration of the fecal sample caused  
by the environment. (Other suppliers'  
slides test only the former and use hemo-  
globin). Thus, Helena asserts, the patent  
requires a control that deteriorates in the  
same way as the blood deteriorates in the  
fecal sample. Hemoglobin does not deteri-  
orate like blood (note the instability prob-  
lem Dr. Lawrence related), hence, Helena  
reasons, the patent claims cannot include  
hemoglobin. Per Helena, the specification  
suggests instead that hemin will perform  
both functions in the positive monitor, as

rence referred to the tendency of catalytic com-  
pounds to decay over time.

will a compound that "reacts to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin" in the blood of the fecal sample.

Helena's argument fails for a number of reasons. Most basic is the fact that neither the claims nor the specification require the positive monitor catalyst to deteriorate like blood in a fecal sample. In addition, the argument ignores entirely the specific disclosure in the specification that hemoglobin is a suitable compound for use as the catalyst. Finally, Helena offers no evidence to show that hemin, which it argues is encompassed by the claims, is relatively more like blood in the fecal samples in terms of deterioration than is hemoglobin.

### 3. Prosecution History

The prosecution history is still another tool useful for claim interpretation. *See, e.g., ZMI Corp.*, 844 F.2d at 1580, 6 USPQ2d at 1561; *McGill Inc.*, 736 F.2d at 673, 221 USPQ at 949. The district court relied most heavily on that tool and determined that, through a claim amendment, the inventors had narrowed the claims to exclude hemoglobin.

The claim limitation at issue was not present in the original claims as filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Instead, claim 1 provided "the improvement comprising: a control area having a positive and a negative monitor said control area positioned on a portion of the sheet." The Examiner rejected the claims as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982), citing United States patents to Pagano (3,996,006) and Friend (4,175,923).

Friend discloses a "throw-in-the-bowl" type of test product made of paper impregnated with guaiac. A section of the paper also has impregnated a blood component (forming a built-in positive monitor). The user sprays the entire paper sheet with developer and first observes it to confirm that the guaiac chemical is working properly. Proper functioning is assured if the part of the paper impregnated with blood component turns blue. The user then drops the product into a toilet bowl containing fecal matter, where the remainder of

the paper will turn blue if the fecal matter contains blood or will remain white, indicating the absence of blood.

The Examiner maintained that it would have been obvious from the teaching of Friend to provide positive and negative monitors on the Pagano slide. In response to the First Office Action, on January 25, 1982, the inventors argued that "Friend fails to disclose any negative monitor or control." Thereafter, the Examiner issued a Final Action rejecting the claims as obvious: "Even though Friend is concerned with positive control, it would be obvious to the routineer that both positive and negative controls could be incorporated in Pagano."

The Examiner granted the inventors an interview on July 8, 1982, which the Examiner summarized as discussing the arguments "that areas are not only control but monitors of performance for both false positives and negatives" and "that prior art does not show a negative monitor that indicates false positives." The inventors described the interview, in an Amendment After Final Rejection filed on July 20, 1982, as emphasizing "that Friend fails to disclose any negative monitor or control.... The criticality of having a negative monitor present on the occult blood slide was thoroughly discussed at the interview." At this point in the prosecution, neither the Examiner nor the inventors had mentioned the limitation now at issue.

Those parties then conducted a telephone interview on July 27, 1982. In his Summary Record of the conversation, the Examiner states:

Agreed to amendment of the claims as per Examiner's Amendment (Paper No. 9) to particularly recite the positive and negative monitors.

Paper No. 9 contained the amendment introducing the "similar to hemoglobin" limitation at issue. Following that amendment, the '970 patent claims were allowed on August 6, 1982.

The district court concluded that the Examiner allowed the patent claims only because of the amendment to overcome the disclosure in the Friend patent. Finding

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that Friend discloses use of hemoglobin as the positive monitor catalyst, the court determined that the amendment narrowed the claims to avoid that disclosure by excluding hemoglobin from the '970 claims.

Where the district court clearly erred is in its last finding, that the amendment was made to overcome the disclosed use of *hemoglobin* in a monitor. Friend does not specifically disclose or claim a hemoglobin catalyst. Rather, Friend claims "blood" as a substrate or composition for the positive monitor catalyst. Friend's patent specification discloses "commercially available dried human or animal blood" and "components of blood" as the positive catalyst. Consequently, Friend's teaching, although it includes hemoglobin as the catalyst, was not so restricted and an amendment excluding hemoglobin but including hemin (another blood component) would not have overcome Friend's broad disclosure of blood component catalysts.

Thus, we are unpersuaded that the amendment to claim subject matter "similar to" hemoglobin was made to overcome Friend's disclosure of a hemoglobin catalyst. The purpose of the amendment is unclear. SKD reads the Examiner's statement that the amendment was made "to particularly recite the positive and negative monitors" literally and contends that the amendment was made only to satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."), and not to avoid an obviousness rejection based upon the prior art. We need not determine the purpose for the amendment. We merely hold that the district court's finding, that the amendment was made to overcome Friend's disclosure of a hemoglobin catalyst, is clearly erroneous.

### 3. Section 103 provides in relevant part:

A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the

### 4. Conclusion

The district court's findings that the inventor believed hemoglobin would not work and that the claims were amended to exclude hemoglobin disclosed as a catalyst in the prior art are clearly erroneous. We conclude, as a matter of law, that the asserted claims of the '970 patent, properly interpreted, include hemoglobin itself, as well as compounds that react to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin, as a positive monitor catalyst.

Because we have determined that the district court improperly interpreted the claims, the remainder of its decisional process on the issues of validity and infringement is distorted. *See, e.g., Panduit Corporation v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.*, 810 F.2d 1561, 1576, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1603 (Fed.Cir.) ("When the prior art is compared with erroneously interpreted claims, findings of differences between the prior art and the claims will necessarily be clearly erroneous."), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2187, 95 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987); *Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc.*, 794 F.2d 653, 656, 229 USPQ 992, 994 (Fed.Cir.1986) (improper claim construction can distort entire infringement analysis). Keeping this in mind, we now turn to those issues.

### B. Validity

#### 1. Obviousness

##### a. The Standard

[2] Helena challenges validity of the '970 patent on the grounds that the claimed invention would have been obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).<sup>3</sup> In evaluating that challenge, the district court properly began its analysis with the presumption that the patent is valid. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982). That presumption places the burden of proof of facts, and the ultimate burden of persuasion to establish invalidity, on Helena. *See, e.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co.*, 804 F.2d 135, 138, 231 USPQ 644, 646 (Fed.Cir.), *amended* 1 USPQ2d 1209

subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.



(Fed.Cir.1986). In reviewing the district court's factual findings underlying its conclusion, we are governed by the clearly erroneous standard. *See, e.g., Panduit Corp.*, 810 F.2d at 1566, 1 USPQ2d at 1595-96. We review the conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness drawn from the facts so reviewed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 1569, 1 USPQ2d at 1598.

#### b. *The Factual Inquiries*

Although the district court upheld the validity of the claims in issue, it did so only if the claims were interpreted to exclude hemoglobin. 662 F.Supp. at 626. Having concluded that hemoglobin is within the claims, we can affirm the judgment of validity only if the facts are undisputed or if the court made other findings which lead to that same legal conclusion of nonobviousness despite the claims' coverage of hemoglobin.<sup>4</sup> The latter situation occurs here. The court found that "[t]he '970 patent discloses and claims the *first* fecal occult blood specimen test *slides having built-in positive and negative monitors* for verifying the proper performance of the slide." *Id.* at 624 (emphasis added). The court also made the following findings which are pertinent to the issue of nonobviousness:

Dr. Lawrence of SKD, a coinventor of the '970 patent, followed a different approach [from that historically taken], namely a [sic] built-in positive and negative controls on each slide. This had the advantage of verifying the performance of every slide and it was much easier to use than external controls. Furthermore, a built-in positive monitor printed during manufacturing gave more reproducible results than external controls that were applied in variable amounts. Dr. Lawrence's approach was also new in

that he no longer sought only controls that simulated feces. Monitors that indicated only whether the slide and developer were working properly avoided the confusion that could result from comparing the test results on the actual fecal specimen and on the monitors.

*Id.* at 625.

The above analysis would lead to a conclusion of nonobviousness even if hemoglobin is the catalyst. The court did not explain why hemoglobin as the positive monitor catalyst changed that analysis, and we see none. Helena maintains that the court erred in not holding the claims invalid, whether or not hemoglobin is the catalyst, because the improvement of placing monitors on a Pagano slide is obvious from the Friend teaching of a positive monitor on the throw-in-the-bowl type of occult blood testing device and method. Given the nature of the Friend product, we cannot agree that the disclosure of a control in Friend (whether positive alone or positive and negative) is a sufficient teaching to make the claimed combination obvious.

Friend explicitly discloses only a positive monitor. Although never mentioned by Friend, if the portions of the paper not impregnated with blood component do not remain white when developer is applied, then product contamination would be indicated. The parties dispute whether that fact amounts to an inherent disclosure of a negative monitor. The asserted "inherent" monitor of Friend's claimed product is the test area itself, however, whereas the claims at issue require control areas which are "isolated from" the test areas on the "rear" of the slide. Merely pointing to a negative monitor in the prior art, which constitutes Helena's main argument to establish obviousness, is unpersuasive. Hel-

4. An appellate court may make a finding of fact on evidence that is undisputed. *See, e.g., King v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 458 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir.1972); *Sbicca-Del Mac, Inc. v. Milius Shoe Co.*, 145 F.2d 389, 400, 63 USPQ 249, 260 (8th Cir.1944); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil* § 2577 at 699-701 (1971) ("[I]t is settled that findings are not jurisdictional and the appellate court may decide the appeal without further findings if it feels that it is in a position to do so.... A

remand has been thought unnecessary if all the evidence is documentary or if the facts are undisputed.") (footnotes omitted); *cf. B.D. Click Co. v. United States*, 614 F.2d 748, 755, 222 Ct.Cl. 290, 302 (1980). An appellate court may also make such a finding even when the evidence is disputed if, as a matter of law, the court could only make one finding of fact or decide the fact in only one way. Otherwise, protracted litigation and unnecessary delay and expense would occur. *B.D. Click*, 614 F.2d at 755.

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ena cannot pick and choose among the indi-  
vidual elements of assorted prior art refer-  
ences to recreate the claimed invention.  
*See, e.g., Azko N.V. v. United States Int'l*  
*Trade Comm'n*, 808 F.2d 1471, 1481, 1  
USPQ2d 1241, 1246 (Fed.Cir.1986), *cert. de-*  
*denied*, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2490, 96  
L.Ed.2d 382 (1987). Helena has the burden  
to show some teaching or suggestion in the  
references to support their use in the par-  
ticular claimed combination. *Uniroyal*  
*Inc.*, 837 F.2d at 1051, 5 USPQ2d at 1438-  
39. A holding that combination claims are  
invalid based merely upon finding similar  
elements in separate prior art patents  
would be "contrary to statute and would  
defeat the congressional purpose in enact-  
ing Title 35." *Panduit Corp.*, 810 F.2d at  
1577, 1 USPQ2d at 1605.

Friend's suggestion begins and ends with  
the disclosure of a built-in control. Noth-  
ing in Friend suggests the particular struc-  
ture or method of the claims, read as a  
whole. *Id.* (claims, entire prior art, and  
prior art patents must each be read "as a  
whole"). The claimed structure positions  
the monitors on each slide in such a way  
that the fecal material may contact the  
slide without contaminating the control ar-  
eas. *See* '970 Patent Specification at col. 2,  
ln. 10-18 ("These [monitors] comprise two  
small areas or spots printed on an isolated  
area of the guaiac test paper at some dis-  
tance from the portions of the test paper  
underlying each of the [two test areas]. In  
this manner the positive spot (monitor) is of  
such shape and size and placed in such a  
positive relation to the stool sample(s) that  
there can be no confusion of its blue color  
with that of a positive stool sample.").  
This location provides the advantage that  
the fecal matter may be conveniently test-  
ed at a later time by a laboratory or physi-  
cian, at which time the monitors will also  
be activated. *See id.* at col. 3, ln. 38-53  
("To use the slide, the patient ... applies  
with an applicator a thin smear of specimen  
from a portion of his stool on sheet 32  
through opening 30.... The cover is then  
closed.... The patient returns the slide  
either to his physician or a laboratory. The  
physician or technician [adds] developing

solution ... [and] [t]he test results are  
then observed.").

Helena also asserts that the claim lan-  
guage is so broad that it would encompass  
prior art controls in which a blood compo-  
nent for monitoring purposes is not origi-  
nally on the slide. On the other hand, SKD  
asserts that the claims require that the  
monitor must be built into the slide. We  
agree with SKD.

The specification states that:

It is still a further object of this inven-  
tion to provide a simple, rapid, conve-  
nient, inexpensive and *built-in control*  
*test* which would monitor the test reagent  
from the date of manufacture to the  
date of development.

*Id.* at col. 2, ln. 2-6 (emphasis added). That  
portion of the specification supports the  
district court's view that "[t]he '970 patent  
discloses and claims the first fecal occult  
blood specimen test slide having built-in  
positive and negative monitors for verify-  
ing the proper performance of the slide."  
662 F.Supp. at 624. The claims that the  
district court was referring to when it stat-  
ed its view were claims 1 and 5, which  
require "an area *positioned on* a portion of  
*the sheet* ... said area including a positive  
and negative monitor." (Emphasis added.)  
Thus, we agree with the district court's  
interpretation that the '970 patent claims a  
test slide having built-in positive and nega-  
tive monitors. Accordingly, we conclude  
that, fairly read, the claims cover only  
slides in which the catalyst is built into the  
slide itself.

We also agree with the district court that  
some, but not overwhelming, support for a  
conclusion of nonobviousness is provided  
by the objective evidence. *See, e.g., W.L.*  
*Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.*, 721  
F.2d 1540, 1555, 220 USPQ 303, 314 (Fed.  
Cir.1983) (Objective evidence of nonob-  
viousness "may in a given case be entitled  
to more weight or less, depending on its  
nature and its relationship to the merits of  
the invention. It may be the most perti-  
nent, probative, and revealing evidence  
available" on the issue.), *cert. denied*, 469

U.S. 851, 105 S.Ct. 172, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984).<sup>5</sup>

### c. Conclusion

After consideration of all of Helena's arguments, we are unpersuaded that the facts established by the record lead to the conclusion that the claims of the '970 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment of validity, but on different grounds from those stated by that court.

### 2. Inventorship

[3] Helena contends that the '970 patent is invalid because it does not satisfy the requirement that the true inventor or inventors be named.<sup>6</sup> The springboard to that contention is Helena's interpretation of the '970 patent claims as not restricted to built-in control monitors. Using that springboard, Helena asserts that the patent claims match the work done by Lawrence's and Townsley's predecessors at SKD. We agree with the district court, however, that the claims are restricted to built-in monitors. Helena does not contend that Lawrence and Townsley were not the true inventors of the claimed subject matter when the claims are so interpreted.

Helena frames an additional challenge to the '970 patent on the grounds that the named joint inventors did not jointly invent every claim in the '970 patent. SKD does not contest that fact; instead, it relies on the current patent statute, which provides:

Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.

35 U.S.C. § 116 (1982) (as amended by the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub.

L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984) (hereinafter, "the Act")). If this section applies to the '970 patent, Helena's challenge fails. We hold that section 116 applies.

The 1984 amendments made a number of substantive changes in the patent statute. Section 106(a) of the Act, *reprinted at* 35 U.S.C. § 103 note (Supp. II 1984), states that with certain exceptions "the amendments made by this Act ... shall apply to all United States patents granted before, on, or after the date of enactment [Nov. 8, 1984]." At least, *prima facie*, the 1984 amendment of section 116 applies to the '970 patent. Helena asserts, however, that it does not apply retroactively because of the exception provided in section 106(e). Section 106(e) states: "[T]he amendments made by this Act shall not affect the right of any party in any case pending in court on the date of enactment to have their rights determined on the basis of the substantive law in effect prior to the date of enactment." This case was pending on November 8, 1984, the date of enactment. The "substantive law" in effect on that date, per Helena, was that a patent was invalid for failure to name proper inventors unless the inventorship entity named was the true origin of *every* claim in a patent containing more than one claim, i.e., the "all claims" rule.

Helena's argument fails because the "all claims" rule was not uniformly accepted as "the substantive law" before the 1984 Act. *Compare In re Sarett*, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 n. 7, 51 CCPA 1180, 1189 n. 7, 140 USPQ 474, 479 n. 7 (CCPA 1964); *In re Hamilton*, 37 F.2d 758, 759, 4 USPQ 224, 227 (CCPA 1930); *Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co.*, 358 F.Supp. 91, 101, 177 USPQ 432, 439 (W.D.Mo.1973); *Stewart v. Tenk*, 32 F. 665, 666 (S.D.Ill.1887), *with United States v. Teletronics, Inc.*, 658 F.Supp. 579, 592, 3 USPQ2d 1571, 1580 (D.Colo. 1987); *Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pepe*

provided would have outbalanced that case and shown nonobviousness.

5. We need not decide whether, had resolution of the factual inquiries presented a "clear and very strong case of obviousness," *EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc.*, 755 F.2d 898, 907, 225 USPQ 20, 25 (Fed.Cir.), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 131, 88 L.Ed.2d 108 (1985), rather than nonobviousness, the objective evidence

6. The patent statute provides that "whoever invents or discovers" the patentable subject matter "may obtain a patent therefor." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).

*Johnson & Johnson*, 745 F.2d 1437, 1449, 223 USPQ 603, 610 (Fed.Cir.1984); *cf. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States*, 384 F.2d 391, 399, 181 Cl.Cl. 55, 65, 155 USPQ 697, 704 (1967) (patentee cannot construe claims narrowly before Patent Office and later broadly before court).

As indicated above, Dr. Lawrence never stated that hemoglobin would not work as a catalyst. Claims 1 and 5 of the '970 patent cover compounds that react to environmental conditions in a manner similar to hemoglobin. We have held these claims to include hemoglobin itself as one possible catalyst. Thus, hemoglobin does not operate in a substantially different way from the compounds claimed—which include hemoglobin—and we reject Helena's argument based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Estoppel to Deny Infringement

[6] With respect to Helena's slides containing lead acetate as the catalyst in the positive monitor, SKD concedes those slides do not infringe the '970 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. SKD poses, however, a unique "infringement by estoppel" theory. In April 1984, Helena began marketing COLOS-CREEN slides containing lead acetate in place of hemoglobin, but failed to alter a package insert stating that the positive monitor contained hemoglobin. The insert was not corrected until November 1985. SKD's theory is that Helena, by incorrectly identifying hemoglobin as the catalyst in the positive monitor, obtained sales to customers who would not otherwise have purchased Helena's product. Had customers known Helena's product did not contain a catalyst similar to the hemoglobin the test was designed to discover, SKD argues, they would not have purchased Helena's product. Having obtained the benefit of such sales, Helena should be estopped, per SKD, from denying that the COLOS-CREEN slides marketed between April 1984 and November 1985 contain hemoglobin. Accordingly, because slides containing hemoglobin infringe the '970 patent,

8. Because we have decided that Helena's accused product containing hemoglobin as the positive monitor catalyst literally infringes the '970 patent claims, we need not and do not review the district court's analysis of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

9. We note the line of cases sometimes called "marking estoppel" cases, in which, under some circumstances, a party that marks its product

the lead acetate slides, per SKD, infringe by estoppel.

The district court rejected SKD's position that these facts establish an estoppel. SKD's theory of estoppel rests on *Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp.*, 364 F.Supp. 547, 179 USPQ 596 (N.D.Ill.1973), *aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds*, 504 F.2d 1086, 183 USPQ 577 (7th Cir.1974), and its assertion that the case is "completely analogous and should be followed in this case." In *Crane*, Crane licensed Aeroquip to manufacture pipe couplings under the former's patent. Aeroquip then modified its product, which the district court found did not infringe Crane's patent, but continued to place Crane's patent number on its modified couplings. Citing "marking estoppel" cases,<sup>9</sup> the district court found Aeroquip "estopped to deny that it is *liable for royalties* on [the modified] couplings." 364 F.Supp. at 560, 179 USPQ at 606-07 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit found that the modified couplings came within the scope of the claims and, thus, expressed "no opinion" on the marking estoppel issue. 504 F.2d at 1093, 183 USPQ at 581.

Whatever the validity of the "marking estoppel" line of cases, we do not find *Crane* applicable to the present case. Helena never took a license under SKD's patent. Accordingly, *liability for royalty* payments is not at issue here. Helena did not place an erroneous patent number on its lead acetate product; it erroneously identified the catalyst used on its product. The district court in *Crane* reached its result, in part, on the reasoning that

it should be recognized that application of the marking estoppel doctrine in this case should have an important therapeutic function in protecting the public interest. Manufacturers should be on notice

with a patent number is estopped from asserting that the product is not covered by the patent. See, e.g., *Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 361 F.2d 791, 796-97, 149 USPQ 877, 880-81 (6th Cir.1966); *Collis Co. v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp.*, 41 F.2d 641, 645, 6 USPQ 109, 113 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 282 U.S. 886, 51 S.Ct. 90, 75 L.Ed. 781 (1930); *Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley*, 108 F. 870, 872 (2d Cir.1901).

r SKD, infringe

1 SKD's position  
h an estoppel.  
rests on *Crane*  
64 F.Supp. 547,  
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i, 149 USPQ 877,  
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45, 6 USPQ 109,  
S. 886, 51 S.Ct.  
Novelty Co. v.  
ir.1901).

that care must be taken in avoiding mis-  
representation to the public that goods  
are protected by a patent.

364 F.Supp. at 560, 179 USPQ at 607. Such  
reasoning is inapplicable to this case.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this title,  
whoever without authority makes, uses  
or sells any patented invention, within  
the United States during the term of the  
patent therefore, infringes the patent.  
Helena's lead acetate product is not the  
"patented invention" and, therefore, is not  
an infringement as defined by the statute.  
We do not accept the proposition that an  
*admittedly noninfringing* product can be  
converted by estoppel to an infringing  
product.

#### 4. Summary of Infringement Analy- sis

Based on properly interpreted claims,  
Helena's slides which contain hemoglobin  
literally infringe the asserted claims of  
the '970 patent. The district court's find-  
ing of noninfringement is clearly errone-  
ous, based as it is upon a legally erroneous  
interpretation of the asserted claims. We  
reverse that portion of the court's judg-  
ment finding noninfringement by Helena's  
hemoglobin-containing slides. With re-  
spect to Helena's slides containing lead ace-  
tate as the positive monitor catalyst, how-  
ever, we agree with the court that SKD  
failed to carry its burden of proving in-  
fringement. Accordingly, we affirm the  
court's finding of noninfringement as to  
the lead acetate product.

#### D. Inequitable Conduct

[7] In its cross appeal, Helena contends  
that the district court erred in failing to  
hold the '970 patent unenforceable. The  
grounds for Helena's charge of unenforce-  
ability are four alleged breaches of the  
duty to disclose material information, and  
to disclose that information accurately, to  
the PTO during prosecution of the '970  
patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1987). Such  
a breach may constitute inequitable con-  
duct sufficient to render a patent unen-  
forceable. See, e.g., *J.P. Stevens & Co. v.*

*Lex Tex, Ltd.*, 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223  
USPQ 1089, 1092 (Fed.Cir.1984), *cert. de-*  
*nied*, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 73, 88 L.Ed.2d  
60 (1985); *American Hoist & Derrick Co.*  
*v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.*, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-  
63, 220 USPQ 763, 773 (Fed.Cir.), *cert. de-*  
*nied*, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 95, 83 L.Ed.2d  
41 (1984).

Having found no infringement, the dis-  
trict court apparently did not consider it  
necessary to reach the question of enforce-  
ability. Because we reverse the finding of  
noninfringement, the defense of inequ-  
itable conduct must be considered. When  
the pertinent facts are undisputed, as here,  
an appellate court need not remand for the  
trial court to make findings and conclu-  
sions but may resolve the issue. See, e.g.,  
*Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington*, 475  
U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 1530, 89 L.Ed.  
2d 739 (1986); *UMC Elecs. Co. v. United*  
*States*, 816 F.2d 647, 657, 2 USPQ2d 1465,  
1472 (Fed.Cir.1987), *cert. denied*, — U.S.  
—, 108 S.Ct. 748, 98 L.Ed.2d 761 (1988);  
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982) ("any ...  
court of appellate jurisdiction may ... di-  
rect the entry of such appropriate judg-  
ment ... as may be just under the circum-  
stances.").

To hold that a patentee has committed  
inequitable conduct, this court has uniform-  
ly held that *both* materiality and intent  
must be proven by clear and convincing  
evidence. See, e.g., *FMC Corp. v. Manito-*  
*woc Co.*, 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2d  
1112, 1115 (Fed.Cir.1987). Thus, "[t]o be  
guilty of inequitable conduct, one must  
have intended to act inequitably." *Id.*  
Proof of deliberate scheming is unneces-  
sary; gross negligence may constitute suf-  
ficient wrongful intent to support a holding  
of inequitable conduct. See *Reactive Met-*  
*als & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc.*, 769 F.2d  
1578, 1583-84, 226 USPQ 821, 825 (Fed.Cir.  
1985).

In the present case, however, there is no  
evidence of actual wrongful intent or gross  
negligence by the patentee. Helena's com-  
plete failure to present any evidence of  
intent likely follows its initial misunder-  
standing, which it later corrected, that "un-  
der the relevant case law, intent is not

material to a determination of unenforceability, since Helena is *not* alleging fraud." As stated above, this court has uniformly held evidence of intent, not only material but, a *requirement* for a holding of inequitable conduct. Such evidence need not be direct, it may be inferred from the patentee's conduct. See *Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co.*, 740 F.2d 1529, 1538-39, 222 USPQ 553, 561-62 (Fed.Cir.1984). Nevertheless, some evidence on the issue must exist.

Because Helena has failed to present any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that the '970 patent was procured by an applicant having withheld information through at least grossly negligent conduct, it has failed to raise a genuine issue for trial that the '970 patent is unenforceable.

#### E. Helena's Other Defenses & Counterclaim

On appeal it is Helena's burden to show not only that the district court erred, but also to persuade this court that had such error not occurred the result might have been different. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982); *Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.*, 770 F.2d 1015, 1021, 226 USPQ 881, 884 (Fed.Cir.1985) ("Even assuming that such errors were committed [by the district court], Cable must demonstrate that if the errors were corrected, the application of the law to the facts present would produce a different result. In short, such errors as may be demonstrated must have further been harmful.") (citations omitted); *Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc.*, 725 F.2d 1338, 1345, 220 USPQ 777, 782 (Fed.Cir) (in banc) (courts of appeal shall disregard harmless errors which do not affect parties' substantive rights), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 830, 105 S.Ct. 116, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984). None of Helena's other charges of error rise to that level. The remaining "errors" concern matters on which the court made no specific rulings.

Although Helena charged SKD with unfair competition, *inter alia*, from interference with customer and vendor relationships and from patent misuse, the evidence on these matters is so inconsequential that

the district court apparently did not treat it as a viable issue. Similarly, the assertion that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on an absence of direct evidence that Helena sold infringing products at the time SKD brought suit is meritless. Indirect evidence from which such inference may be drawn is adequate. Having reviewed the evidence called to our attention by Helena, we see no reason to remand for the district court to make specific rulings on these matters. No *prima facie* case was made out on any of them. Moreover, after the court issued its memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law without specific rulings, Helena failed to bring the alleged omissions to the trial court's attention. Helena's failure to give the court an opportunity to correct its alleged error in not ruling on these matters, under the circumstances here, could be deemed a waiver. Given their lack of substance, however, we are unpersuaded of prejudicial error in any event.

### III

#### CONCLUSION

We affirm those portions of the district court's judgment holding claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 valid as between the parties, on different grounds. We also affirm that portion of the court's judgment finding that Helena's product containing lead acetate does not infringe the '970 patent. We reverse the portion of the court's judgment finding Helena's hemoglobin product noninfringing. We remand for calculation of damages.

#### COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs of appeal.

MODIFIED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.



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